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DoS and DDoS Attacks: Defense, Detection and 
Traceback Mechanisms - A Survey
K. Munivara Prasad α, A. Rama Mohan Reddy σ  & K. Venugopal Rao ρ
Abstract- Denial of Service (DoS) or Distributed Denial of
Service (DDoS) attacks are typically explicit attempts to 
exhaust victim’s bandwidth or disrupt legitimate users’ access 
to services. Traditional architecture of internet is vulnerable to 
DDoS attacks and it provides an opportunity to an attacker to 
gain access to a large number of compromised computers by 
exploiting their vulnerabilities to set up attack networks or 
Botnets. Once attack network or Botnet has been set up, an 
attacker invokes a large-scale, coordinated attack against one 
or more targets. As a result of the continuous evolution of new 
attacks and ever-increasing range of vulnerable hosts on the 
internet, many DDoS attack Detection, Prevention and 
Traceback mechanisms have been proposed, In this paper, 
we tend to surveyed diﬀerent types of attacks and techniques 
of DDoS attacks and their countermeasures. The signiﬁcance 
of this paper is that the coverage of many aspects of
countering DDoS attacks including detection, defence and 
mitigation, traceback approaches, open issues and research 
challenges.
Keywords: denial of service (DoS), distributed denial of
service (DDoS), detection mechanisms and trceback 
approaches.
I. Introduction
enial-of-service (DoS) attacks exploit internet to 
target critical Web services [1, 2, 3, 4, 5,6]. This 
type of attack is intended to prevent legitimate 
users from accessing a speciﬁc network resource or 
degrade normal services for legitimate users by sending 
huge unwanted traffic to the victim (machines or 
networks) to exhaust services and connection capacity 
or the bandwidth. Increasing flow of these DoS attacks 
has made servers and network devices on the internet at 
greater risk. 
Denial of service attack programs are around 
for several years.  Previous   single source attacks are 
currently countered simply by several defense 
mechanisms and therefore the source of those attacks 
will be simply rejected or blocked with improved tracing 
capabilities. However, with the amazing growth of the 
internet throughout the last decade, an increasingly 
large amount of vulnerable systems are currently 
available to attackers. Attackers will currently use a huge 
range of those vulnerable hosts to launch an attack 
rather than employing a single server, an   approach   
Author α: Research scholar, Department of CSE, JNTUH, Hyderabad.
e-mail: prasadkmv27@gmail.com 
Author σ: Professor, Department of CSE, SVUCE,SV University, Tirupati
Author ρ: Professor and Head, Department of CSE, GNITS, 
Hyderabad.
that  is not terribly effective and detected easily. 
A distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack [7, 
12] is a large-scale, coordinated attack on the provision 
of services of a victim system or network resources, 
launched indirectly through a large number of
compromised computer agents on the internet. Before 
applying an attack the attacker takes large number of
computer machines under his control over the internet 
and these computers are vulnerable machines. The 
attacker exploits these computers weaknesses by
inserting malicious code or some other hacking 
technique so that they become under his control. These 
vulnerable or compromised machines can be hundreds 
or thousands in numbers and these are commonly 
termed as ‘zombies.’ The group of zombies usually 
formed the ‘botnet.’  The magnitude of attack is 
depends on the size of botnet, for larger botnet, attack 
is more severe and disastrous.
DDoS attacks in the Internet can be launched 
using two main methods. In the ﬁrst method the attacker 
send some malicious packets to the victim to confuse a 
protocol or an application running on it (i.e., vulnerability 
attack [8]). The Second method essentially include the 
network/transport-level/ application-level ﬂooding 
attacks [8], in which an attacker to do one or both of the 
following: (i) interrupt a legitimate user’s connectivity by 
exhausting bandwidth, network resources or router 
processing capacity or (ii) disrupt services of a 
legitimate user’s by exhausting the server resources 
such as CPU, memory, disk/database bandwidth and 
I/O bandwidth.
Nowadays, DDoS attacks are often launched 
through well organized, remotely controlled, and widely 
distributed Zombies or Botnet computers of a network, 
that are continuously or simultaneously sending a huge 
amount of trafﬁc or service requests to the target 
system. The attack results the target system either 
responds so slowly, unusable or crashes completely 
[8],[9] [10]. Zombies of a botnet are usually recruited 
through the use of Trojan horses, worms, or backdoors 
[11]–[13]. It is very difficult for the defense mechanisms 
to identify the original attacker because of the use of
spoofed IP addresses by zombies under the control of
the attacker with botnet [14].
Earlier DDoS attacks were manual, in which 
attacker had to implement many steps before the launch 
of ﬁnal attack, which includes port scanning, identifying 
compromised machines or zombies in the internet to 
D
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create botnet, deploying malware etc. Nowadays, 
sophisticated and automated DoS or DDoS attack tools 
been developed to assist attackers in implementing all 
or some steps automatically with minimal human eﬀort 
to launch these attacks. The attackers can just conﬁgure 
desired attack parameters for a specified attack and the 
rest is managed by automated tools. Some of the 
common automated attack tools available are TFN 
(Tribe Flood Network), Trinoo, TFN2K, Shaft, 
Stacheldraht, Knight and Trinity. Many of them work on 
IRC (Internet Relay Chat) in which handlers and zombies 
communicate indirectly without revealing their identities. 
The others are agent based where handlers and 
zombies know each other’s identity and communicate 
direct [9].
II. DDoS Attacks Classification and 
Architectures
a) DDoS Motivation
DDoS attackers are usually motivated by 
various reasons. We categorized these DDoS attacks 
based on the motivation of the attackers into seven main 
classes: 
1. Financial/economical gain: Attacks launched for 
ﬁnancial gain are often, the most dangerous and 
difficult to stop. These are mainly concern of
corporations and require more technical skills and 
experience. 
2. Invariably slow network performance: The attacker 
launches an attack to block the resources of victim 
system, which slowdowns the performance of the 
system and intern to the network.
3. Revenge: Attackers of this kind are normally with 
lower technical skills and are frustrated individuals, 
carry out these as a response to a perceived 
injustice.
4. Ideological belief: Attackers in this category are 
inspired by their ideological beliefs to attack their 
targets. This category is currently one of the major 
incentives for the attackers to launch DDoS attacks. 
5. Intellectual Challenge: In this, attack the targeted 
systems for experiment and learn how to launch 
various attacks. They are usually young hacking 
enthusiasts who want to show off their 
competencies. 
6. Service unavailability: In this attacker overloads the 
services offered by the victim system through 
unwanted or fake traffic.  
7. Cyberwarfare: Attackers of this class is normally 
belong to the military or terrorist organizations of a 
country and they are politically motivated to attack a 
wide range of critical sections of another country. 
b) Classification
Various classiﬁcations of DDoS attacks have 
been proposed in the literature, when DDoS attacks are 
classiﬁed based on the degree of automation, they are 
defined as Manual, Semi-automatic and Automatic 
attacks. In manual approach the attacker had to 
complete many steps before the launch of ﬁnal attack, 
such as port scanning, identifying available machines in 
the public or private network to build botnet, inserting 
malware etc. For Semi-automatic or Automatic attacks, 
various sophisticated attack tools have been developed 
to support attackers in carrying out all or some steps 
automatically to reduce human eﬀort. The attackers can 
conﬁgure desired attack parameters and the rest is 
done by automated tools. 
Another classification of DDoS attacks by attack 
rate i.e., how the rate of attack varies with respect to the 
time. The classes are Continuous Rate and Variable 
Rate attacks. The attack has constant ﬂow in continuous 
rate after it is executed. But as in, variable rate attack 
changes its impact and ﬂow with time, making it more 
diﬃcult to detect and respond. Within variable rate, the 
attack rate can further be applied as Fluctuating or 
Increasing. Additionally, based on the data rate of
attack, traffic in a network is also categorized as high 
rate and low rate DDoS attacks. 
DDoS attacks further classiﬁed as ‘by impact’ 
i.e., in which the normal service is completely 
unavailable to users known as Disruptive, or it can be 
Degrading the services of victim system in which it is not 
completely unavailable or decrease in the efficiency. 
In direct attacks, agents or zombie machines 
directly attack the victim system as shown in the in 
Figure. 1. But in reﬂector attacks, zombies send request 
packets to a number of other compromised machines 
(PCs, routers etc.) called Zombies or Bots and the reply 
generated Zombies is targeted towards the victim 
system for an impact desired by the attacker. Example 
for this attack is sending huge amount of traffic as ‘ping’ 
request with spoofed IP address to the victim system to 
saturate bandwidth. 
The main classiﬁcation of DDoS attacks is ‘by 
exploited vulnerability’ through which an attacker 
launches attack on the victim. The classiﬁcation is given 
in Fig. 2 .In this classiﬁcation, ﬂood attack is used to 
block the victim’s machine or network’s bandwidth. This 
can be performed as TCP flood, UDP ﬂood and ICMP 
ﬂood. In general, all ﬂooding attacks generated through 
DDoS can as direct attacks or reﬂector attacks.
c) DDoS attacks architectures 
DDoS attack networks uses three types of
architectures: the Agent-Handler architecture, Internet 
Relay Chat (IRC)-based architecture and the Web based 
architecture.
i. Agent-Handler Architecture
The Agent-Handler architecture is also referred 
as Botnet based architecture, in which the attacker uses 
the botnet to launch an attack. Generally a group of
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zombies or bots that are controlled by an attacker (also 
called as bot Master) form a botnet. Botnets consist of
masters, handlers, and bots as shown in Figure 3. The 
handlers are means of communication that attackers 
use to command and control indirectly the bots. The 
handlers can be programs installed by the attackers on 
a collection of compromised systems (e.g.,Network 
servers) to send commands to carry out the attack. Bots 
are devices that have been compromised by the 
handlers and that will carry out the attack on the victim’s 
system. Figure 4 shows all the elements of a botnet. The 
owners and users of the bot systems are generally 
unaware of the situation.
ii. IRC-based architecture
The bot master or controller launches an attack 
through the bots by sending the commands to them 
which intern behave according to the master 
instructions. At the other end the bot sends the 
response or the status information to the master.  Their 
communication is done through public chat systems 
instead of doing these with their original addresses. If
they use the original identity or private channels, the 
detection system easily track and block the location and 
system. Internet relay chat (IRC) is the one which allows 
the users to communicate without performing any 
authentication check and no security to user 
communications. IRC provides a text-based command 
syntax protocol to define the rules and regulations to the 
users and that is installed widely across the network. 
There is huge number of existing IRC networks available 
in the internet and which can be used as public 
exchange points, but the majority IRC networks doesn’t 
contain any strong authentication. The wide variety of
tools in the internet is available to provide anonymity on 
IRC networks. Therefore, IRC provides simple, low-
latency, widely available, and anonymous command 
and control channel for botnet communication. An IRC 
network is a collection of one or more IRC servers as 
depicted in figure 4.
iii. Web-based architecture
Botnets are using HTTP as a communication 
protocol to send commands to the bots making it more 
difﬁcult to track the DDoS command and control 
structure. Like IRC-based botnets web-based botnets 
do not maintain connections with command and control 
d) DDoS Strategy
A Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack 
consists of several elements as shown in Figures 1. 
There are four steps in launching a DDoS attack. These 
are shown in Figure 5.
1. Discover vulnerable hosts or agents: The attacker 
selects the agents to perform the attack. Any 
systems which is running with no antivirus software 
or pirated copies of software in internet is vulnerable 
and operated as a compromised system. Attackers 
utilized these compromised hosts or bots for further 
scanning and compromises .Attacker generates the 
attack stream by using the abundant resources of
these compromised machines. 
2. Compromise: The attacker exploits vulnerabilities 
and security holes of the agent machines and 
installs the attack code.
3. Communication: The
 
attacker communicates with 
the handlers to identify the active agents, to 
schedule attacks or to upgrade agents. The 
communication among the attackers and handlers  
servers or handlers. The Web bots downloads the 
instructions using web requests periodically. Web-based 
botnets are stealthier since they hide themselves within 
legitimate HTTP trafﬁc. Advanced web development 
languages (PHP, ASP, JSP, etc.) through encrypted 
communication over HTTP or HTTPS protocol are used 
to configured and control the bots.
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Figure 1 :  (a).Direct attack,                 (b).Indirect attack 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 :  DDoS attacks Classifications 
 
 
  
 
 
 
       
 
 
 
 
 
 
       Figure 3 : Agent handler Architecture Figure                                    Figure 4 : IRC- based  Architecture 
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can be done through various protocols such as 
TCP,UDP or ICMP and based on the network 
configuration with single handler or multiple handlers.
4. Launching an Attack: The attacker launches an 
attack by selecting the victim system, attack 
duration and adjusting the features of the attack 
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such as the type, length, Time to Live(TTL), and port 
numbers. 
Figure 5 : Phases of performing DDoS attacks
III. DDoS Defense, Detection and 
Mitigation
a) DDoS Defense Architectures
When a DDoS attack is detected, there is 
nothing that can be done except manually ﬁx the 
problem and disconnect the victim system from the 
network. DDoS attacks blocks a lot of resources such as 
CPU power, bandwidth, memory, processing time, etc., 
on the paths that lead to the targeted system. The main 
goal of any DDoS defense mechanism is to detect 
DDoS attacks as soon as possible and stop them as 
near as possible to their sources. DDoS defense 
schemes are divided into four classes based on the 
locality of deployment: source-end, victim- end, Core-
end or intermediate router and Distributed or Hybrid 
defense mechanisms. The advantages and 
disadvantages of all these approaches are given in the 
table1.
i. Source-end defense mechanism
Source-end defense mechanisms are deployed 
at the sources of the attack to prevent network users 
from generating DDoS attacks. In this approach, source 
devices identify malicious packets in outgoing traffic and 
ﬁlter or rate-limit the traffic. Detecting and stopping a 
DDoS attack at the source is the best possible defense 
as minimum damage is done on legitimate traffic.
ii. Victim-end defense mechanism
In the victim-end defense mechanism, the 
victim system detects, ﬁlter or rate-limit malicious 
incoming traffic at the routers of victim networks, i.e., 
networks providing Web services. The legitimate and 
attack traffic can clearly be distinguished from either 
online or offline, using either misuse based intrusion 
detection or anomaly based intrusion detection. 
However, attack traffic reaching the victim may denied 
or degraded services and bandwidth saturation.
iii. Core-end or Intermediate router defense 
mechanism
In core-end or intermediate network defense 
scheme, any router in the network can independently 
attempt to identify the malicious traffic and ﬁlter or rate-
limit the traffic. It also balances the trade-offs between 
detection accuracy and attack bandwidth consumption. 
Detection and traceback of attack sources becomes 
easy, due to collaborative operation. In this point of
defense, the traffic is aggregated i.e., both attack and 
legitimate packets arrive at the router and it is a better 
place to rate-limit all the traffic.
iv. Distributed-end or Hybrid Defense architecture
Attack detection and mitigation at distributed 
ends can be the best strategy against DDoS attacks. 
The hybrid defense mechanisms are deployed at (or 
their components are distributed over) multiple locations 
such as source, Victim or intermediate networks and 
there is usually cooperation among the deployment 
points. The core-end is best to rate-limit all kinds of
traffic whereas the victim-end can accurately detect the 
attack traffic in a combination of legitimate and attack 
packets. Therefore, distribution of methods of detection 
and mitigation at diﬀerent ends of the network can be 
more beneficial.
b) DDoS Detection and Mitigation Strategies
In this section, we present a summary of
existing methods on DDoS attack detection and 
mitigation. These methods are based on the 
architectures discussed above namely source-end, 
Victim-end, Core-end and Hybrid mechanisms in the 
network. We classify methods for DDoS attack detection 
into four major classes as shown in Figure 6.
i. Statistical Methods
Statistical properties of normal and attack 
patterns can be exploited for detection of DDoS attacks. 
Generally a statistical model for normal traffic is 
calculated and then a statistical inference test is applied 
to determine if a new instance of the traffic or flow 
belongs to this model. Instances that do not follow the 
learnt model, based on the applied test statistics results, 
traffic or flows are classiﬁed as anomalies.
Chen et al. [19] develop a distributed change 
point (DCP) detection architecture using change 
aggregation trees (CATs). The pre-change and post-
change network traffic was described using non-
parametric CUSUM approach. The cumulative deviation 
is higher than random increase when a DDoS flooding 
attack is launched and CAT mechanism is designed to 
detect abrupt changes in traffic flows work at router 
level. The traffic change patterns were detected at the 
domain server uses attack-transit to construct the CATs, 
which represent the attack ﬂow pattern. 
D-WARD [20] detects an attack based on 
constant monitoring of bidirectional traffic ﬂows between 
Discover vulnerable hosts or agents
Compromising the Vulnerable hosts
Agent Communication
Launching an Attack
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the network and the Internet and based on the periodic 
deviation analysis with the normal ﬂow patterns. 
Abnormal ﬂows are rate limited in proportion to their 
arrival rate. D- WARD offers a good detection rate along 
with the reduction of DDoS attack traffic signiﬁcantly. It 
uses a predeﬁned model for normal traffic and detects 
anomalies in the two-way traffic based on the deviation 
statistics. Finally, D-WARD notices the traffic for either 
conﬁrmation of the attack or refutation. If conﬁrmed, D-
WARD further controls the rate limit. However, if refuted, 
it gradually allows increased traffic rate.
Saifullah [21] proposes a defense mechanism 
by using distributed algorithm that performs weight-fair 
throttling at upstream routers. The throttling is weight-fair 
because the traffic intended for the server is controlled 
(increased or decreased) by using leaky buckets at the 
routers based on the number of users connected, 
directly or indirectly to the routers. In the beginning of
the algorithm, the survival capacity is underestimated by 
the routers so as to protect the server from any sudden 
initial attack. The survival capacity is initialized to 
minimal or normal values at the beginning of the 
algorithm and the rate is updated (increased or 
decreased), based on the server’s feedback sent to its 
child routers and ultimately propagated downward to all 
routers, in the successive rounds of the algorithm with
an assessment to converging the total server load to the 
acceptable capacity range.
Peng et al. [22] describe a new approach to 
detect bandwidth attacks by observing the arrival rate of
new source IP addresses. The detection system is 
based on an advanced non-parametric change 
detection scheme, CUSUM. Cheng et al. [23] propose 
the IP Flow Feature Value (FFV) algorithm using the vital 
features of DDoS attacks, such as ﬂow dissymmetry, 
abrupt traffic change, distributed source IP addresses 
and concentrated target IP addresses. ARMA prediction 
model is established for normal network ﬂow using a 
linear prediction technique. Then a DDoS attack 
detection scheme based on anomaly detection 
techniques and linear prediction model (DDAP) is used.
Udhayan and Hamsapriya [24] defines a 
Statistical Segregation Method (SSM), by sampling the 
ﬂow in consecutive intervals and compares the samples 
with the attack state condition and sorts them based on 
the  mean parameter. Attack ﬂows from legitimate ﬂows 
are segregated using correlation analysis.
In [25], a generic DoS detection scheme was 
introduced based on maximum likelihood criterion with 
random neural networks (RNN). This approach initially 
selects a set of traffic features in offline mode to obtain 
pdf estimates and to evaluate the probability ratios. It 
measures the features of incoming traffic and attempts 
to decide according to each feature to take decision. 
Lastly, it obtains an overall decision using both feed-
forward and recurrent architectures of the RNN.  A brief
summary of these methods is given in Table 1.
In [26], authors present a lightweight tunnelling 
protocol called LOT, to prevent network traffic against IP 
spooﬁng and ﬂooding attacks. It is deployed at 
network’s communication gateways. Two gateways with 
LOT implementation can detect each other and create 
the tunnel between them to secure communication. The 
protocol allows the gateway to discard spoofed IP 
packets which specify source addresses in other 
gateway and vice versa and communication can be 
protected from any type of DDoS attacks. The use of
per-ﬂow quotas to identify ﬂooding of packets from 
different networks mitigation the DDoS attacks. The LOT 
protocol not only passes restricts spoofed packets to 
destination and also ﬁlter packets based on ﬁltering 
rules determined by destination gateway.
In [27], authors attain DDoS detection with 
enhanced time limits through non-asymptotic fuzzy 
estimators. The estimator is deployed on mean packet 
inter-arrival times. The problem is divided into two parts; 
one is actual DDoS detection and the other is 
identiﬁcation of victim IP addresses. The ﬁrst part is 
achieved using strict real time limits for DDoS detection. 
The second part i.e., identiﬁcation of victim IP addresses 
is attained through comparatively relaxed constraints. 
The goal is to identify victim IP addresses in a timely 
manner to launch added anti intrusion applications on 
oﬀended hosts using packet arrival time as the main 
statistic of DDoS attack determination. 
A game theoretic approach is followed in [28] to 
oﬀer defense against DoS/DDoS cyber-attacks. The 
DDoS attack is modelled as a one-shot & zero-sum 
game with non-cooperation. To perform an attack, 
multiple features are investigated in terms of cost with 
malicious traffic distribution and number of attackers. It 
is validated in analytical terms that a single optimal 
strategy of defense is available to defender in which 
upper boundaries are set to attacker payoﬀ depending
upon the rational or irrational attackers. Table 2 presents 
a brief summary of the Statistical based DDoS detection 
methods.
ii. Soft computing based methods
Learning paradigms, such as Artiﬁcial Neural 
Networks (ANNs), radial basis functions and genetic 
algorithms are widely used in DDoS attack detection 
because of their ability to classify intelligently and 
automatically. Soft computing is a method of describing 
a set of optimization and processing techniques that are 
tolerant of imprecision and uncertainty.
Artiﬁcial Neural Networks (ANNs) are widely 
used learning models with their ability to cope with 
demands of a changing environment [32]. These ANNs
are self-learning and self-organizing models with the 
features like robustness, fault tolerance and parallelism. 
ANNs are good to identify and resist unknown 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6 :  DDoS Detection and Mitigation methods 
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disturbances in a system because of its self-learning 
characteristic. 
In [33], authors use Linear Vector Quantization 
(LVQ) model of ANN. It is same as self-organizing maps 
and applied the techniques of pattern recognition, multi-
layer classiﬁcation and data compression. In supervised 
learning, it knows the target output against diﬀerent 
forms of various input patterns. After testing the system 
with LVQ model, authors use the same dataset with 
Back propagation (BP) model of ANN for comparative 
study. On the basis of comparison results, they claim 
that LVQ is more accurate in determining DDoS attacks 
than BP. They show that LVQ is 99.723% accurate on 
average against tested dataset whereas the average 
accuracy of BP is 89.9259% for the same dataset. 
Accuracies are computed on the basis of percentages 
of obtained false positives and false negatives against 
each sample of testing data. There are 10 samples used 
to test the systems for each of the LVQ and BP models.
In [34], authors train the BP neural network with 
a traffic entropy variations dataset as inputs and  DDoS 
strengths as outputs. 20 diﬀerent samples in the dataset 
are used for training with 10Mbps attack strength as the 
lowest and 100Mbps being the highest in the dataset. 
The entropy variations are calculated based on an 
assumption that the attack traffic is seen diﬀerent in the 
network from normal traffic. The model is tested with 
random inputs of four entropy variations and calculated 
attack strengths respectively as 20, 50, 70 and 95Mbps. 
The BP neural network’s output is obtained with little 
errors. False positives and false negatives are very less 
and also the system is tested with variations in network 
size i.e., number of neurons in processing layer but in 
real cases, increasing the network size also increases 
both training time and implementation cost.
          In [35], authors propose Time Delay Neural 
Network (TDNN) to acquire early warning system 
against DDoS attacks. TDNN is a neural network in 
which time delay factor is hidden inside the 
representative signal.  The authors created a 
Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) and TDNN is implemented in 
two-layer pattern. The node action is monitored by 
neighboring nodes and attack information is sent to the 
expert module for integrated analysis. The layered 
structure enables the system to ensure some 
appropriate actions as a proactive strategy against 
DDoS attacks. The detection results on deployed 
architecture show that proposed scheme is able to give 
82.7% correct detection rate as compared to 46.3% with 
general Intrusion Detection System (IDS).
            Jalili et al. [36] introduce SPUNNID as DDoS 
attack detection system based on a statistical pre-
processor and unsupervised artiﬁcial neural network. It 
use statistical pre-processing to extract features from 
the traffic, and uses an unsupervised neural network to 
analyse and classify traffic as an attack or normal traffic.
          Karimazad and Faraahi [37] propose an anomaly-
based DDoS detection method using Radial Basis 
Function (RBF) neural networks based on features of
attack packets analysis. It is applied to classify data as 
normal or attack categories. If the incoming traffic is 
identified as attack traffic, the attack packets source IP 
address are sent to the Filtering Module and the Attack 
Alarm Module performs further actions. Otherwise, if the 
traffic is normal, it is directed to the destination. 
Gavrilis and Dermatas [38] present a detection 
method for DDoS attacks in public networks based on 
statistical features estimated in short-time window 
analysis of incoming data packets. A small number of
statistical parameters are used to define the behavior of
the DDoS attacks. An accurate classiﬁcation is achieved 
using Radial Basis Function neural networks than this.
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Table 1 : Comparison of DDoS attack Defense architectures
Defense 
Method
Advantages Disadvantages
Source-end 
Defense 
Architecture
• Detecting and stopping a DDoS attack at the 
source provides best possible defense as 
minimum damage is done on legitimate 
traffic.
• Minimum amount of traffic to be checked at 
source point for which fewer resources are 
required by the detection & mitigation 
mechanism.
• Detecting DDoS attacks at source end is difficlut 
because sources are widely distributed across 
the network and a single source behaves like a 
normal traffic.
• The difficulty of deploying system at the source 
end.
Victim-end 
Defense 
Architecture
• Detecting DDoS attacks in victim routers is
relatively easy because of the high rate 
consumption of resources.
• Best practically applicable type of defense 
scheme as Web servers providing critical 
services always try to secure their resources 
for legitimate users.
• During DDoS attacks, victim resources, e.g., 
network bandwidth, often gets over- whelmed 
and these approaches cannot stop the ﬂow 
beyond victim routers.
• Detect the attack only after it reaches the victim 
and detecting an attack when legitimate clients 
have already been denied is not useful.
Core-end 
Defense 
Architecture
• Detection and traceback of attack sources 
are easy in this approach due to collaborative 
operation.
• The traffic is aggregated i.e., both attack and 
legitimate packets arrive at the router and it is 
a better place to rate-limit all the traffic.
• Deployment is the main difficulty with this 
approach.
• To attain full detection accuracy, all routers on 
the Internet will have to follow this detection 
scheme, because unavailability of this scheme in 
one router may cause failure to the detection and 
traceback process.
• Full practical implementation is extremely difficult 
because it requires the reconﬁguration of all the 
routers on the Internet.
Distributed-end 
or Hybrid 
Defense 
architecture
• Detection can be done at the victim side and 
the response can be initiated and distributed 
to other nodes by the victim. 
• Distribution of methods of detection and 
mitigation at diﬀerent ends of the network 
can be more beneficial.
• Strong cooperation among the deployment 
points is required.
• Complexity and overhead because of the 
cooperation and communication among 
distributed components scattered all over the 
Internet.
Wu et al. [39] proposes detection of DDoS 
attacks using decision trees and grey relational analysis. 
The detection of the attack from the normal state is 
defined as a classiﬁcation problem. They use 15 
attributes, to monitor the incoming/outgoing packet/byte 
rate, and also collect the TCP, SYN, and ACK ﬂag rates, 
to define the traffic ﬂow pattern. The decision tree 
method is used to develop a classiﬁer to detect 
abnormal traffic ﬂow and also use a novel traffic pattern 
matching procedure to identify traffic ﬂow similar to the 
attack ﬂow and to trace back the origin of an attack.
In [42] the authors proposes ensemble of classifiers 
which uses the Resilient Back Propagation (RBP) neural 
network as the base classiﬁer for DDoS Detection. They 
are mainly focussed on improvement of the 
performance of the base classiﬁer. The RBPBoost 
combines the output of the ensemble of classiﬁer 
outputs and Neyman Pearson cost minimization strategy 
[43], for ﬁnal classiﬁcation decision. Table 3 presents a 
brief summary of the soft computing.  
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Table 2 : Statistical based DDoS Detection methodsReference
Reference Objective Deployment Working Mode Remarks
Mirkoviac al. et[20] Attack prevention Source side Centralized Statistical traffic modelling is used to 
Detect DDoS attacks and blocks the 
attack traffic when it is detected at source 
end.
Akella.et al.[31] Attack detection Source and victim 
side
Distributed A profile is constructed from normal traffic 
and detects anomalies in the traffic using 
stream sampling. In general this 
approach used in the network routers.
Prasad,
ARMReddy,
KVGRrao[41]
Attack detection victim side Distributed Modeling and Counter measures of
Flooding attacks to ITM using Botnet and 
Group Testing.
Peng.et al.[22] Detecting 
bandwidth 
attacks
Victim side Centralized Sequential nonparametric change point 
detection method is used to improve the 
detection accuracy and employed at 
victim end.
Chen.et al.[19] Attack
detection
and Traceback
Between source 
and destination
network
Distributed Hybrid approach which is used to detect 
and trace back the attack source.
Oke and
Loukas [25]
Attack detection Victim  side Centralized Defines a set of attack specific input 
features that captures the behavior and 
the long term statistical properties of the 
traffic during detection.
Saifullah[21] Attack prevention Between source 
and destination 
network
Distributed Prevention method which protects 
Internet servers and routers from DDoS 
attacks using distributed weight-fair 
throttling from the upstream routers.
Chen[29] Attack detection Victim side Centralized Detects DDoS attacks using two-sample
t-test by integrating the statistics of SYN 
arrival rate.
Zhang.et 
al.[30]
Attack detection Victim side Centralized Uses an Auto Regressive Integrated Auto 
Regressive (ARIMA) model for protecting 
servers from DDoS attacks.
Cheng.et 
al.[23]
Attack detection Victim side Centralized Activities four flow features: asymmetry of
the flow, burst in the traffic volume, 
distributed source IP destination IP 
address while detecting DDoS attacks.
Udhayanand
Hamsapriya[24]
minimize false 
alarm
Victim side Centralized Statistical segregation method is used to 
detect DDoS attacks based on sampling 
of traffic flow in consecutive time interval.
Table 3 : Soft computing based DDoS Detection methods
Reference Objective Deployment Working Mode Remarks
Jalili.et al[36] Attack 
detection
Victim side Centralized Statistical preprocessor and unsupervised 
neural network classifier methods were used 
for DDoS attack detection.
Gavrilis 
&Dermatas[38]
Attack detection Victim side Centralized Detects DDoS attacks using statistical 
features estimated in short time interval in 
public network with Radial basis function of
neural network.
Nguyen and
Choi[40]
Attack detection Intermediate 
network
Centralized K-nearest neighbour based technique is used 
to detect only known attacks.
Wu et al. [39] Attack detection 
and traceback
Victim side Distributed Trace back to the attacker location based on 
traffic flow pattern matching using decision 
trees.
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Karimazad
And Faraahi[37]
Attack detection Victim side Centralized Low false alarm rate can be achieved using 
Radial Basis Function (RBF) neural networks.
Kumar and
Selvakumar[42]
Attack
detection
Victim side Centralized High detection rate in RBP Boost can be 
achieved using the combination of an 
ensemble of classifier outputs and Neyman 
Pearson cost minimization strategy. 
methods presented in this section. Table 3 presents a 
brief summary of the soft computing methods presented 
in this section.
iii. Knowledge based Methods
In knowledge-based approaches, network 
events or actions are tested against predeﬁned rules or 
patterns of attack. In these, general representations of
known attacks are called as attack signatures and these 
are formulated to identify actual occurrences of attacks. 
Knowledge-based approaches include expert systems, 
signature analysis, self-organizing maps, and state 
transition analysis.
Gil and Poletto [44] present a heuristic data 
structure named as MULTOPS (MUlti-Level Tree for 
Online Packet Statistics), that monitor traffic 
characteristics of network devices like routers to detect 
and eliminate DDoS attacks. MULTOPS is a tree of
nodes which includes traffic rate statistics for subnet 
preﬁxes at different aggregation levels and was 
expansion and contraction of the tree occurs within a 
pre-speciﬁed memory size. A MULTOP of network 
device detects bandwidth attacks by the occurrence of
a signiﬁcant difference between traffic rates going to 
and coming from the victim or the attacker. Routers or 
network monitors equipped MULTOPS may fail to detect 
a bandwidth attack that is fixed by attackers that 
randomizes IP attack source addresses on malicious 
packets. It also fails to detect attacks that deploy a large 
number of attack ﬂows to explode a victim.
Thomas et al. [45] introduces a practical 
approach with high performance DDoS defense 
mechanism called as NetBouncer. It distinguishes 
legitimate and illegitimate use of resources and ensuring 
that are made available only for legitimate use. It allows 
traffic to ﬂow with respective to a long list of recognized 
legitimate clients and if packets are received from a 
source not on the legitimate list, a NetBouncer device 
invite administer to perform variety of legitimacy tests to 
test the client to prove its legitimacy. If a client proved its 
authorization, it is added to the legitimacy list and 
subsequent packets from the client are accepted.
Wang et al. [46] present a methodical way of
modeling DDoS attacks using Augmented Attack Tree 
(AAT), and implemented an AAT-based attack detection 
algorithm. It explicitly captures the specific subtle 
incidents triggered by a DDoS attack and the 
corresponding state changes from the observation of
the network traffic transmission on the primary victim 
server. With reference to the conventional attack tree 
(CAT) modeling method, AAT is advanced because it 
provides additional information like the state transition 
process. It overcomes the limitations of CAT modelling. 
Limwiwatkul and Rungsawang [47] discover 
DDoS attack signatures by analysing the TCP/IP packet 
header against pre deﬁned rules and conditions, and 
differentiating the difference between normal and 
abnormal traffic flow. These mainly focus on ICMP, TCP 
and UDP ﬂooding attacks.
Zhang and Parashar [48] introduced a 
distributed approach to defend against DDoS attacks in 
the Internet. To detect DDoS attacks independently, 
defensive systems are deployed in the network, unlike 
traditional IDS, this method detects and stops DDoS 
attacks within the intermediate network. An IRC 
communication is used between these independent 
detection nodes to exchange information about network 
attacks and combined this information for aggregate 
network attacks. Individual defence nodes obtain 
estimated information about global network attacks and 
stop the attacks more effectively and accurately using 
the aggregated information of network. An earlier 
approach depends on monitoring the volume of traffic 
received by the victim and these are incompetent of
distinguishing a DDoS attack from a ﬂash crowd. 
Lu et al. [49] defines a perimeter-based DDoS 
defese system, in which the traffic is analyzed at the 
edge routers of an Internet Service Provider (ISP) 
network. The DDoS defense system consists of two 
major components: (1) temporal-correlation based 
feature extraction and (2) spatial-correlation based 
detection. It accurately identifies and detect DDoS 
attacks without changing existing IP forwarding 
mechanisms at routers. A brief summary of these 
knowledge based methods is given in Table 4.
iv. Data mining and machine learning methods
In [50] the authors proposed an effective 
defensive system called as NetShield to protect client 
hosts, network routers and network servers from 
becoming victims, zombies and handlers of DDoS ﬂood 
attacks. It protects any IP-based public network on the 
Internet and uses preventive and rate limiting to 
eliminate system vulnerabilities on target machines. It 
enforces dynamic security policies for protecting 
network resources against DDoS ﬂood attacks. 
Chen et al. [51] introduces DDoS Container as 
a comprehensive framework for DDoS attack detection. 
It uses a network based detection method to defense 
complex and simple types of DDoS attacks and works in 
parallel to inspect and control ongoing traffic in real 
time. It covers stateful inspection on traffic flow streams 
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and correlates actions among different sessions by 
continuous monitoring of both DDoS attacks and 
legitimate applications. It terminates the session when it 
detects a DDoS attack.
Lee et al. [52] propose proactive detection 
method for DDoS attacks by exploiting an architecture 
comprising of a selection of handlers and agents that 
communicate, compromise and attack. It performs 
cluster analysis. The authors presented the results using 
the DARPA dataset, were each phase of the attack 
scenario is segregated well and can detect originators 
of a DDoS attack as well as the attack itself.
Sekar et al. [53] inspect the design space for in-
network DDoS detection and propose a triggered, multi-
stage approach that addresses both scalability and 
accuracy. They designed and implemented the LADS 
(Large-scale Automated DDoS detection System), which 
makes effective use of the data readily available to an 
ISP.
Rahmani et al. [54] designed a joint entropy 
analysis of for DDoS attack detection using multiple 
traffic distributions. The time series of IP- ﬂow numbers 
and aggregate traffic sizes are statistically dependant 
and were this occurrence of an attack affects the 
dependence and causes a break in the time series for 
joint entropy values. 
A low-rate DDoS attack detection difficult 
compared with the Normal attacks because of its 
similarity with normal traffic. In [55] defined two new 
information metrics: (i) generalized entropy metric and 
(ii) information distance metric, to detect low- KK DDoS 
attacks. The attack is detected based on the distance 
between legitimate and attack traffic. The generalized 
entropy metric is more accurate than the traditional 
Shannon metric [56]. 
In [57] early detection of ﬂooding DDoS attacks 
are defined using FireCol, which is based on information 
theory. It is deployed in Internet service provider (ISP) 
level as a part of intrusion prevention system (IPS). The 
IPSs create virtual protection rings around the hosts to 
defend and cooperate by exchanging specific traffic 
information. 
The approach described in [58] analyses 
characteristics of DDoS and ﬂash crowd attacks and 
provides an efficient way to distinguish between the two 
in VoIP networks. The authors validated the method 
through simulation. 
In [59] the authors present a wavelet 
transformation and probability theory based network 
anomaly detection approach. It is able to identify known 
as well as unknown DDoS attacks. 
Zhong and Yue [60] implemented a DDoS 
attack detection model which extracts a network traffic 
and a network packet protocol status models and 
defines the threshold for the detection model. K-Means 
clustering algorithm is used to build initial threshold 
values for network traffic of Captured network traffic 
values. Packet protocol status model is built using 
Apriori [61] and FCM [62] for captured packets. When 
the current network traffic exceeds the threshold value, 
the network packet protocol status is checked to identify 
abnormal packets. If there are no abnormal packets 
exist, a new threshold value model is build based on the 
current network using k-means module.
A two-stage automated detection system is 
proposed in [63] for DoS attacks in network traffic. It is 
the combination of traditional change point detection 
method with wavelet transforms [64].  In [65], Li and Lee 
present a systematic wavelet based method for DDoS 
attack detection. DDoS attack traffic is detected using 
energy distribution based on wavelet analysis. Energy 
distribution over time has limited variation if the traffic 
keeps change its behavior over time.
Gupta et al. [66] use ANN to identify the number 
of zombies in a DDoS attack. Sample data is used to 
train a feed-forward neural network created using the 
NS-2 network simulator. The generalization capacity of
the trained network is capable and it is able to calculate 
the number of zombies involved in a DDoS attack with 
test error. 
Cheng et al. [68] proposes the IP Address 
Interaction Feature (IAI) algorithm considering abrupt 
traffic changes, interactions among addresses, many-
to-one asymmetries among addresses, distributed 
source and concentrated target addresses. The IAI 
algorithm is designed to describe the critical 
characteristics of network ﬂow states. A support vector 
machine (SVM) classiﬁer, which is trained by an IAI time 
series with normal and attack ﬂows, is applied to 
classify the state of current network ﬂows and identify 
the DDoS attacks. It has higher detection and lower 
false alarm rates compared to competing techniques.
The method defined in [69] identifies ﬂooding 
attacks in real time and also assess the strength of the 
attackers based on fuzzy reasoning. This process 
consists of two stages: (i) statistical analysis of the
network traffic time series and (ii) identiﬁcation and 
assessment of the strength of the DDoS attack based 
on an intelligent fuzzy reasoning mechanism. 
Zhang et al. [70] define a Congestion 
Participation Rate (CPR) based approach for ﬂow level 
network traffic to detect 
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Table 4 : Knowledge based DDoS Detection methods
Reference Objective Deployment Working Mode Remarks
Gil and Po-
Letto [44]
Attack 
prevention
Between
source and
destination 
network
Centralized Each network device maintains a MULTOPS
data structure to detect attacks that deploy 
a large number of DDoS attack flows using 
a large number of agent and IP spoofing 
attacks.
Thomas et 
al.[45]
Attack 
detection
Victim side Centralized Inline packet processing is used by the Net 
Bouncer to differentiate DDoS traffic from 
flash crowd based on network processor 
technology.
Limwiwatkul 
&
Rung-
Sawang[47]
Attack 
detection
Victim side Distributed Attack signature models are constructed 
using TCP packet headers for DDoS attack 
detection.
Zhang and
Parashar[48]
Proactive Intermediate 
network
Distributed A gossip based scheme uses global 
information about DDoS attacks by 
information sharing to detect attacks.
Lu et al.[49] Attack 
detection
Edge router Distributed Exploits spatial and temporal correlation of
DDoS attack traffic for detecting anomalous 
packet.
Wang.et.
al[4
6]
Attack 
detection
Victim side Centralized Augmented Attack Tree model is used for 
the detection of DDoS attacks.
Table 5 : Datamining and machine learning based DDoS Detection methods
Reference Objective Deployment Working 
mode
Remarks
Hwang et 
al.[50]
Attack prevention Victim side Centralized Protects network clients, routers and servers 
from DDoS attacks using protocol anomaly 
detection 
Li and Lee[52] Attack detection Victim end Centralized An energy distribution based wavelet analysis 
technique defined for the detection of DDoS 
traffic.
Sekar.Et.al[53] Attack detection Source side Distributed A triggered multi-stage approach is defined 
to acquire scalability and accuracy for DDoS 
attack detection.
Gelenbe and
Loukas[73]
DDoS defense Victim end Centralized Detects attack by tracing back flows 
automatically.
Lee et al.[62] Attack detection Source side Centralized Agent handler architecture along with cluster 
analysis is used to Detects DDoS attack 
proactively.
Rahmani et 
al[54]
Attack detection Victim side Distributed A joint entropy analysis used for multiple 
traffic distributions to detect DDoS attacks.
Li and Li[65] Attack detection Victim end Centralized Wavelet transformation and probability theory 
are used to detect DDoS attacks
Dainotti et 
al[63]
Detection of DoS 
attack anomalies
Victim end Centralized Detects attacks accurately using combination 
of traditional change point detection and 
continuous wavelet transformation.
Zhong and
Yue[60]
Attack detection Victim side Centralized Unknown DDoS attacks are detected using 
fuzzy c-means clustering and Apriori 
techniques.
Xia et al. [69] Detects flood attack 
and its intensity
Victim end Centralized Detection of DDoS flooding attack using 
fuzzy logic.
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Xiang et 
al[55]
Detects low rate 
flooding attacks
Victim end Centralized New information metrics used to detect low-
rate DDoS flooding attacks.
Gupta et 
al.[66]
Number of zombies 
identification
Victim end Distributed Uses ANN to evaluate the number of zombies 
in a DDoS attack.
Francois et 
al.[57]
DDoS flooding 
attack detection
Source end Distributed A DDoS flooding attack detection technique 
supports incremental deployment in real 
network.
Jeyanthi and
Iyengar[58]
Flash crowd 
Detection
Victim end Centralized Detects DDoS attacks using entropy based 
analysis.
Prasad,
ARMReddy
,KVGRao[15]
Flash crowd 
Detection
Router/ITM 
level
Distributed Detects DDoS attacks using entropy 
variations.
low-rate DDoS (LDDoS) attacks. A ﬂow of higher CPR 
value leads to LDDoS and subsequent dropping of the 
packets. It identiﬁes DDoS attacks with high detection 
accuracy using correlation of subset of features.
In [71], authors defined an approach to detect 
botnet and their activities based on traffic behaviour 
analysis. Machine learning strategies are used to 
classify traffic behaviour and proved experimentally that 
botnet activities can be identiﬁed in smaller time 
windows with high accuracy.
In [72], low-rate DDoS attacks are detected 
using anomaly based approach. In low-rate DDoS 
attacks methods, attackers send malicious traffic at 
lower transmission rate to mislead traditional anomaly 
based DDoS detection techniques. The authors 
proposed two information metrics, generalized entropy 
metric and information distance metric. These metrics 
are used to measure diﬀerence between legitimate 
traffic and attack traffic to detect DDoS attacks. 
In [73], a mathematical model is proposed to 
provide the beneﬁts of DDoS defence based on 
dropping of attack traffic. The authors used an 
autonomic defence mechanism based on Cognitive 
Packet Network (CPN) protocol to tracing back ﬂows 
coming into a node automatically. A summarized 
presentation of these methods in this category is given 
in Table 5.
IV. Traceback Mechanisms
Identifying attack source(s) through some 
mechanism to block or mitigate the attack at origin is 
referred as Traceback in DDoS defense. Implementing 
the traceback to identify DDoS source accurately is 
diﬃcult because of, easy spooﬁng of source IP
addresses, stateless nature of IP routing without 
knowing the complete path, link layer or MAC address 
spooﬁng and modern attack tools provides to 
implement intelligent attack techniques easily [74]. 
In [75], authors calculated entropy variations of
network traffic to implement a traceback scheme. To 
detect an attack the diﬀerence of entropy values 
between normal traffic and the DDoS attack traffic is 
calculated. If the attack is detected, the traceback is 
initiated towards its upstream routers. The proposed 
scheme provides an advantage over traditional 
traceback approaches in terms of scalability and 
storage requirements in victim or intermediate routers. It 
stores only short-term information i.e, entropy values of
successive time intervals in order to detect the DDoS 
attack. 
In [76], authors presents a method for detection 
and traceback of low-rate DDoS attacks ,where low-rata 
attacks are very much similar to normal traffic and have 
more ability to hide their attack related identities in the 
aggregate traffic. Two new information metrics were 
introduced to detect low-rate DDoS attacks, which are 
generalized entropy metric and information distance 
metric. In this approach, diﬀerence between legitimate 
and attack traffic is identified through the proposed 
information metrics and are capable to detect the attack 
in prier hops earlier than counts mentioned in proposed 
schemes. These information metrics increase detection
accuracy of the system and is capable of identifying 
low-rate DDoS attacks eﬀectively by reducing false 
positive rates. 
In addition to entropy variation scheme, other 
traditional reactive methods also exist to traceback 
DDoS attack sources [74]. In packet marking scheme, 
trace the path through upstream routers towards the 
attack sources i.e., zombies. It is a standard technique 
used in traceback implementations, however contains 
some inherent drawbacks. There exits two types of
packet marking schemes i.e., probabilistic and 
deterministic packet marking.
                 In probabilistic packet marking (PPM), every 
router inserts its IP address probabilistically into the 
packets moving from source to destination. The method 
relies on the assumption that attack packets more 
frequent than legitimate packets. Once the attack is 
detected, the victim requests suﬃcient range of packets 
to reconstruct the path upto the attack source through 
embedded information within the packets. There is no 
speciﬁc ﬁelds defined in an IP packet for markings. 
Therefore, it utilizes infrequently used 16-bit fragment ID 
in IP packets for the markings [78]. However, this 
method has some major drawbacks. For instance, it is 
valid just for direct attacks. It cannot detect the original 
location of attack source just in case of reﬂector attacks 
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because the traced location is of reﬂector machines and 
not the actual zombies. Moreover, in a well distributed 
attack with a reasonably sizable amount of zombies, the 
possibility of wrong construction of the path increases. 
It’s additionally an acknowledged indisputable fact that 
nowadays, due to large number of zombies, the 
attackers reveal real IPs of zombie machines and hence 
the sources are already discovered. The packet marking 
scheme places computational overhead on intermediate 
routers when traceback is initiated. In addition that 
victim remains available during the process of traceback 
to send control messages to upstream routers. The 
bandwidth is saturated due to attack impacts the control 
messages are dropped, it leads to wrong construction 
or misconstruction of attack path. 
Table 6 : Trceback mechanisms of DDoS attacks
Existing 
mechanisms
Traceback Working Principle Advantages Drawbacks
Hash Based 
IP Traceback 
20 byte IP header and first 8 bytes of
payload is logged for every packet 
by the Intermediate routers. Hashing 
is performed on the logged data. 
It requires low storage 
and protects from 
eavesdropping.
Increases the false 
positives and Overhead 
in generating 28 byte 
hash for the packets.
Algebraic 
approach to IP 
traceback
Polynomial functions are used to 
generate traceback data and stores 
in unused bits of IP header.
Noise elimination and 
multiple path 
reconstruction are 
possible and 
robustness is 
improved.
Variations will occur in 
random full path tracing 
schemes and poor 
scaling.
Enhanced 
ICMP 
traceback-
Cumulative 
path[77]
Intermediate routers generate Itrace-
CP message. The victim uses this 
message to trace the attack path 
and source. 
In less time it 
constructs an entire 
attack path.
A change to be made to 
the router and space is 
required to process 
packets.
Advanced and 
Authenticated 
scheme for IP 
Traceback.
Traces the origin of IP packet with 11 
bit hash and distance field of 3 bits 
are generated using 32 bit IP 
address and stored in IP header. 
Low overhead on router 
and network and 
computational 
complexity is very less. 
No time synchronization 
between victim and the 
router and Secret key is 
shared between routers.
Fast Internet 
Traceback 
A packet marking scheme and path 
reconstruction algorithms are used 
at routers and end hosts to receive 
the packet markings. 
Minimal Processing 
time is required to 
traceback the attack 
source for less flow.
False positive rates are 
high.
Deterministic 
packet 
marking [78]
The source of an attack flow is 
identified by employing tracing 
information inscribed in the packet. 
Traceback process 
requires small number 
of packets.
No overload prevention 
and Increase in packet 
header size.
Probabilistic 
packet 
marking [78]
Routers mark the packets with 
probabilistic path information and 
victim reconstructs the attack graph. 
Efficiency and easy 
implementabilty over 
Deterministic Packet 
Marking. 
More number of packets 
and computational work 
involved in traceback 
process.
Probability of finding the 
source traced is low. 
Flexible 
Deterministic 
Packet 
marking [74]
Large scale IP Trace back scheme 
which encodes the information and 
reconstruction the attack path using 
mark recognition.
Traceback process 
requires relatively less 
number of packets and 
minimal Computation 
work. Probability of
finding a source is high.
Packet processing 
consumes more 
resources.
IP Traceback 
for Flooding 
attacks on 
Internet Threat 
Monitors (ITM 
) Using 
Honeypots[16]
Honeypots are used as the proxy 
servers and the attack source is 
traced through honeypot entries.
Low overhead on 
server and no direct 
damage to the server.
Processing delay and 
cost consuming process 
for honeypots.
Decision tree 
and grey 
relational 
Decision trees are constructed for 
the traffic flow with respective 
upstream routers and analyses the 
Upstream routers can 
be easily identified for 
attack strength.
Complicated process 
when for the large size 
network.
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analysis[18] attack strength.
New 
information 
metrics[17]
Information distances are calculated 
for each flow in the network.
Less computational 
complexity for 
calculating the 
information distance.
Accurate detection is not 
possible.
In deterministic packet marking (DPM), the 
router inserts its IP address deterministically into the IP 
packets. This scheme was introduced to overcome the 
drawbacks of probabilistic packet marking, because it 
has easy implementation and needs less computational 
overhead on intermediate routers. However, it also has 
the limitations. In this scheme, packets are marked only 
by ﬁrst ingress edge router with the information i.e., the 
entire is not stored as in PPM. Therefore, it needs even 
additional packets to reconstruct the attack path [74]. 
Furthermore, it additionally has some limitations similar 
to PPM scheme discussed above. This approach is less 
efficient than traditional schemes.
In packet logging scheme [74] which is also 
referred as Source Path Isolation Engine (SPIE), the 
information of each packet is stored or logged at routers 
through which the packet is passed. The routers in this 
approach are termed as Data Generation Agents 
(DGAs). The stored information of the packet includes 
constant header ﬁelds and ﬁrst 8 bytes of the digests 
(payload hashed through many hash functions). Bloom 
ﬁlters are used to store these DGAs, which is a space-
eﬃcient data structure and is capable of reducing 
storage requirements by large magnitude. 
In ICMP messaging scheme [77], routers are 
programmed to send ICMP messages together with the 
network traffic. The ICMP packets contain path 
information such as source address, destination 
address and authentication parameters etc. A typical 
router with this scheme normally sends one ICMP 
messaging packet for every 20,000 packets passing 
through it i.e., a traceback message is sent with the 
proportion of 0.005 percent of the network traffic [74]. A 
summarized presentation of these methods in this 
category is given in Table 6.
V. Conclusion And Work
In this paper, we have presented a broad 
classiﬁcation of various DDoS attacks, DDoS Defensive 
architectures such as Source-end, Victim-end and 
Intermediate architectures. We have also presented 
various Detection and mitigation mechanisms such as 
Statistical based, Soft-computing based, Knowledge 
based and Data mining based approaches along with 
their advantages and disadvantages based on where 
and when they detect and respond to DDoS attacks. 
Finally, we presented an overview of traceback 
mechanisms of DDoS attacks such as packet marking 
schemes, information distance, honey pots and entropy 
variations. Practically it is very difficult to design and 
implement DDoS defense and detection. In real time 
networks, fulfilling all the requirements for DDoS 
detection is not possible and to accomplish this, various 
performance parameters need to be balanced against 
each other delicately and appropriately. 
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